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Introducing Ethics into the Finance Curriculum:
A Simple Three-Level Guide
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Ethics has am'ved in the business school curriculum. But what about the
cumculum offinance? Can ethics be integratedin anymeaningful wayinto the
theory and pedagogy of finance? Given the ever-broader array of topics in
finance, should ethics be included at the inevitable expense ofsomething else?
Are finance instructors qualified to teach ethics any more than ethicists are
qualified to teach finance? In short, are finance educators doing students a
service or disservice by devoting class time to ethics? These are the questions
addressedhere. A menu ofthree different levels ofintegration is supplied; each
level requiring a different commitment ofcurricula resources.

INTRODUCTION
Ethics is now a permanent fixture within business-school curricula. Accreditation
bodies, such as the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), are
following the lead of professional organizations, such as the Chartered Financial Analyst
(CFA) Institute, in promoting business ethics education. But the question still remains
of how best to integrate ethics into the business school curriculum.
Business schools vary considerably in terms of size, academic focus, and resource
availability, so a one-size-fits-all answer to this question would be overly simplistic.
What is clear, however, is that some level of ethics integration is essential given the
current business and administrative milieu. This article focuses specifically on the
integration of ethics into the subject area of finance. It begins from the premise that the
decision has been made to integrate ethics into the finance curriculum. Three levels of
integration are discussed.
Integration Level One
This level requires the minimum commitment necessary to achieve some meaningful
integration. Students are merely made aware of the fact that finance involves
assumptions about human behavior and that this behavior is both complex and
suggestible.
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Integration Level Two
This level requires an intermediate resource commitment. Students are assigned cases
and readings on ethical issues in finance. Class time is devoted to discussion of these cases
and readings in terms of applying ethics theory to the practice of finance.
Integration Level Three
This level requires a significant resource commitment, including modification to the
curriculum and probably the employment of additional instructors. The finance
department offers a class specifically on 'Financial Ethics'.
Which one of these three levels is optimal for any given finance department will
depend on factors such as the size of the department, the flexibility of the existing
curriculum, the physical resources available, and -- most critically -- the intellectual
resources available in the form of faculty willing and able to devote time to the coverage
of ethics. The three levels ofintegration, therefore, represent three levels ofdepartmental
commitment to the integration of ethics into the subject area of finance. The remainder
of this article fleshes out each of these integration levels.
INTEGRATION LEVEL ONE
Concisely defined, ethics is the study of the best justification for action. Thus ethics
is the normative (i.e., prescriptive) study of rationality. At the practical level, a
knowledge of ethics theory gives individuals the intellectual skills necessary to best
answer the question, 'What should I do?' This question is of course faced continually by
any rational individual in many circumstances, including business circumstances, where
more than one course of action is available (what game theorists call a "decision node").
Any normal life, particularly any normal life in business, is a mass of sequential decision
nodes.
Answering this question, 'What should I do?' is not simple; two-thousand years of
moral philosophy attests to this. And clearly a typical finance class is not a suitable venue
for an elucidation of this philosophy. But merely making students aware of the fact that
this is a question to which they should devote serious thought -- i.e., they are not 'hard
wired' to act in any particular way -- is a significant contribution to the introduction of
ethics into finance. This represents Level One Integration. The critical first question that
any finance educator must address, therefore, is how far to go: How much time is going
to be devoted to elucidating this ethical aspect of finance?
To some extent this will depend on the type of material being covered in the finance
class. If the material is largely technical in nature with little to no bearing on human
behavior -- i.e., on the question 'What should I do?' -- then a discussion of ethics is
inappropriate. But if the material does address behavior then a discussion of the
justification for the behavioral choices -- i.e., a discussion of ethics -- is very appropriate.

2

Journal ofFinancial Education

Traditionally, finance has t;
were personal wealth maxim
performance based incentive sc
with that of principals.
More recently, however, be
as opportunistic wealth maxim
even in financial contexts, is act
agency theory would imply. SI
unpredictable ways but also -
behavior is malleable and open
to behave, or in ways that they
they observe their peers behavi
agency theory, opportunistic WI
Lesson Plan

What follows is a suggested
class. This plan is condensed fm
Rationality ofVirtue (1997). It a
and is intended to provide fim
conduct a meaningful discussiOl
The business environment
- - comprises a complex web ofi
unique set of objectives and COl
Coase on The Nature ofThe Fin
for minimizing the costs and rna
agency problems. Although con
forms, a general distinction c.
contracts.
Explicit Contracts

Broadly defined, explicit I
themselves to legal enforceme
bondholder covenants, union wa
rights. There are three basic pre

1) Feasibility: The intangiblt
explicit contract unfeasible.

2) Cost: Even if theoretical
expensive given legal fees all

Spring 2008

""

itment. Students are assigned cases
evoted to discussion ofthese cases
,practice of finance.

ent, including modification to the
itional instructors. The finance
lics'.
ly given finance department will
Ilt, the flexibility of the existing
most critically -- the intellectual
ble to devote time to the coverage
esent three levels ofdepartmental
'ct area of finance. The remainder
els.

Lstification for action. Thus ethics
lality. At the practical level, a
:ellectual skills necessary to best
11 is of course faced continually by
ng business circumstances, where
e theorists call a "decision node").
ss, is a mass of sequential decision
.ot simple; two-thousand years of
nance class is not a suitable venue
ng students aware of the fact that
:hought -- Le., they are not 'hard
mtribution to the introduction of
ion. The critical first question that
ar to go: How much time is going
nce?
erial being covered in the finance
th little to no bearing on human
-- then a discussion of ethics is
lavior then a discussion of the
on of ethics -- is very appropriate.

umal ofFinancial Education

•
Traditionally, finance has taken a pretty simplistic view of human behavior. Agents
were personal wealth maximizing opportunists. Hence the heavy promotion of
performance based incentive schemes as a means of aligning this self interest of agents
with that of principals.
More recently, however, behavioral finance has questioned this notion ofrationality
as opportunistic wealth maximization. Researchers have found that human behavior,
even in financial contexts, is actually far more complex and suggestible than traditional
agency theory would imply. Specifically, not only do people behave in complex and
unpredictable ways but also -- and this is crucial to our present discussion -- people's
behavior is malleable and open to suggestion: people behave in ways that they are told
to behave, or in ways that they think they are supposed to behave, or in ways in which
they observe their peers behaving. In short, contrary to the assumptions of traditional
agency theory, opportunistic wealth maximization is not a law of nature.
Lesson Plan
What follows is a suggested framework for introducing ethical issues into a finance
class. This plan is condensed from Chapters One, Two, and Three of Finance Ethics: The
Rationality ofVirtue (1997). It approaches ethics from the perspective of agency theory,
and is intended to provide finance instructors with the minimum tools necessary to
conduct a meaningful discussion of ethics in finance.
The business environment _~ as viewed through the lens of conventional finance
-- comprises a complex web of interrelated interest groups, each distinguishable by their
unique set of objectives and constraints. Indeed, since the pioneering work of Robert
Coase on The Nature ofThe Finn (1937), corporations have been viewed as mechanisms
for minimizing the costs and maximizing the efficiency of these contractual relations or
agency problems. Although contractual agreements between stakeholders take on many
forms, a general distinction can be made between explicit contracts and implicit
contracts.
Explicit Contracts
Broadly defined, explicit contracts are those that appear in writing and lend
themselves to legal enforcement (albeit at a cost). Examples of such contracts are
bondholder covenants, union wage contracts, product warranties, and shareholder-voting
rights. There are three basic problems with explicit contracts:
1) Feasibility: The intangible nature of a business arrangement may simply make an
explicit contract unfeasible.
2) Cost: Even if theoretically feasible, an explicit contract may be prohibitively
expensive given legal fees and other documentation costs.
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Figure 1. The Agency Relationship
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3) Enforceability: Any explicit contract is binding only if it is recognized as being
enforceable. If those bound by the contract do not feel that the contract is
enforceable, then they will feel free to breach it with impunity. Therefore, no matter
how well it is drawn up, the contract will have little practical value.
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1976, p. 308). These situations tal
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PRINCIPAL
shareholder
bondholder
shareholder
board of direct
investor
investor

Implicit Contracts
Because of the above problems, much financial interaction relies on implicit
contracts. Implicit contracts do not readily lend themselves to legal enforcement; they
are "too nebulous and state-contingent to reduce to writing at reasonable cost" (Cornell
and Shapiro, 1987, p. 6). Examples of implicit contracts are many and varied. The most
common include a producer's commitment to product quality, a stockbroker's
commitment to execute a client's security transaction at the best available price, or
management's commitment to act in the interests of shareholders. The analysis of
implicit contracts in finance generally comes under the nomenclature of agency theory.

These agency relations can t
and moral hazard. The differeno
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Agency Theory
Adverse Selection
Agency theory analyzes situations in which "one or more persons (the principal(s»
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which

4

Joumal ofFinancial Education

In adverse selection, the unc
precludes the principal from co

Spring 2008

...
Figure 2. Informational Asymmetry
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involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent" (Jensen and Meckling,
1976, p. 308). These situations take on many forms in finance. Some of the most common
would include the following:
PRINCIPAL
shareholder
bondholder
shareholder
board of directors
investor
investor

AGENT
manager
manager
board of directors
manager
market analyst
stock broker

These agency relations can be loosely categorized into two types: adverse selection
and moral hazard. The difference between these two categories is essentially a function
of the nature and degree of uncertainty inherent in the contractual situation.
Adverse Selection

>r more persons (the principal(s))
rvice on their behalf which
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In adverse selection, the uncertainty stems from an asymmetry of information that
precludes the principal from costlessly identifying the type of agent. Asymmetry of
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information is common in agency relations. The classic such relation in finance is that
of managers and shareholders (see Figure 2): shareholders may be unable to costlessly
determine the true earnings expectations of managers.
For example, consider two firms: "Good" and "Bad." The Good firm has relatively
superior future earnings prospects, whereas the bad firm has relatively inferior future
earnings prospects. The firms cannot choose whether they are good or bad (formally, the
agent's type is exogenously determined). Furthermore, the different earnings prospects
of the two firms are not readily apparent from their financial statements or other
generally available information. Thus the contractual environment is one characterized
by informational asymmetry: the agents (i.e., the insiders or managers of the firm) know
more about their respective firm's prospects than do the principals (i.e., the outside
investors).
The ability of the principals to make optimal (i.e., wealth maximizing) investment
decisions is a function of their ability to distinguish between the Good firm and the Bad
firm. Thus the agency problem stems directly from the informational asymmetry. Since
a firm's type is not directly observable, principals attempt to make inferences from signals
emitted-either advertently or inadvertently-by the firms. For example, the Good firm
might consistently pay a large cash dividend that the Bad firm cannot afford to imitate
given its inferior earnings.
Equilibria
If the Good agent is able to devise and emit an effective signal, then it engenders
what agency theorists term a separating equilibrium in which the two agents become
distinguishable to principals and thus the informational asymmetry is overcome. If such
a signal does not exist, then the informational asymmetry endures and a pooling
equilibrium ensues:
- Separating Equilibrium: The principal is able to discern the different types of
agent, whether the agent is the manager of the Good or Bad firm.
- Pooling Equilibrium: The undesirable outcome from the principal's perspective in
which the principal is unable to distinguish the agent's type.
Even if a separating equilibrium is achieved, note that there are generally costs
involved. A successful signal, whether it be a large dividend payout or some other, can
often be costly for the agent to emit. If the signal is not costly, then it is something the
"Bad" agent might easily be able to mimic. In other words, if there had been no initial
informational asymmetry or if the Bad agent chose to honestly reveal its type, then the
Bad agent would often be no worse off and the Good agent would be better off through
not having to fund the signal.
Formally, the separating equilibrium is said to be second best because there is a

6

Journal ofFinancial Education

deadweight or 'dissipative' cost
not recouped by the other agent
overcome, are not zero-sum ga:
wealth from principal to agent,
in aggregate.
Moral Hazard

If each agent above coule
informational asymmetry wOl
attained without the need fc
motivations to mimic superior
temptation on the part of the a
interests of the principal is tl
selection contains at its heart
represents the fundamental b
fundamental behavioral dilem
asymmetry is minimal, there Il
moral hazard: basic conflict of
The classic agency problen
firm moves from private to pu

Spring 2008

.....

Figure 3. Moral Hazard
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deadweight or 'dissipative' cost levied on the economy in aggregate (a cost to one agent
not recouped by the other agent or the principal). Thus agency problems, even ifthey are
overcome, are not zero-sum games. Weare not dealing merely with a redistribution of
wealth from principal to agent, but rather with an absolute wealth loss to the economy
in aggregate.
Moral Hazard
If each agent above could be relied upon to honestly reveal its type, then the
informational asymmetry would disappear and a separating equilibrium would be
attained without the need for costly signals. But inferior agents may well have
motivations to mimic superior agents and thus perpetuate the agency problem. This
temptation on the part of the agent to act in his or her own interest rather than in the
interests of the principal is termed moral hazard. Thus every situation of adverse
selection contains at its heart the problem of moral hazard. As such, moral hazard
represents the fundamental behavioral dilemma of agency theory, and indeed the
fundamental behavioral dilemma of financial economics. Thus even if informational
asymmetry is minimal, there may still be a significant agency problem in the form of
moral hazard: basic conflict of interest.
The classic agency problem of this type is managerial perquisite consumption. As a
firm moves from private to public ownership, there is a separation of ownership and
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control. The owners bear the cost of managers' perquisite consumption (e.g., business
lunches, corporate jets, etc.) but the managers make the decisions on how many "perks"
to consume. Barring effective accountability-in other words barring a resolution to the
agency problem-a "rational" wealth-maximizing management, who no longer bears the
full cost of its perks, may be predisposed to consume perks to an excessive degree. to a
degree that compromises the value of the firm as a whole. Potential shareholders and
bondholders, cognizant of management's "rational" predisposition, will lower the price
at which they are willing to buy the firm's equity or debt.
This agency problem of moral hazard is illustrated by the game tree in Figure 3,
which depicts a simple conflict of interest between two players: A and B. Player A might
represent a group of shareholders considering an investment in a company whose
management is represented by player B. David Kreps summarizes the game's playas
follows:
First A must choose whether or not to trust his opponent. Ifhe (A) elects not to trust
B, then both A and B get nothing. If he elects trust, B is made aware of this fact and
is given the option either to honor that trust or to abuse it. If A trusts B and she (B)
chooses to honor that trust, both get $10. But if A trusts B and she chooses to abuse
it, B gets $15 and A loses $5. (1984, p. 12)
Assume that each player's payoff from the game is common knowledge. In other
words there is no informational asymmetry and to the extent that there is an agency
problem it would be characterized as one of simple moral hazard. As Kreps explains, the
game begins with player A deciding whether or not to trust player B. If he (A) does
decide to trust B, then she (B) must decide whether to honor or abuse that trust.
Those of you familiar with Game Theory will recognize Figure 5 as a one-sided
version of the infamous Prisoners' Dilemma game. If we assume that both players are
rational in the financial-economic sense, and thus are primarily motivated to maximize
their payoff, then presumably, if called upon to move, Bwill abuse the trust vested in her
by A. Realizing this, A will never offer trust, and a contract between these two players
will not be entered into. The most reasonable outcome for this game, therefore, is for
each player to receive a payoff of $0.
However, such an outcome is clearly not the most desirable, either from the point
of view of the two players as individuals or from the point of view of the economy as a
whole, in that the maximum total payoff of $20 is not attained (this would be the first
best outcome). The unwillingness of player A to trust player B has cost both players $10.
But then why should B honor trust if her immediate payoff is maximized by abusing it?
And whatever B might actually plan on doing, why should A assume that B is going to
honor trust when he can see that abusing it yields her the higher payoff?
How can this desirable outcome, based on mutual trust, be reached? Given these
economically 'rational' agents, there is only one way it can be reached: through a
predisposition on the part of player B to build and maintain a reputation.
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The Reputation Solution
Reputation-building behavior involves the sacrifice of short-run income in the
expectation of greater long-run income. In Figure 3, for example, player B will sacrifice
$5 per play ofthe game in order to maintain her reputation for honoring trust. She would
rationally do this in order to induce the principal to offer trust in future plays of the
game. Reputation, therefore, would appear to remedy the fundamental agency problem.
But just how reliable is this reputation solution?
Conditions Necessary for Reputation to Work
Condition 1: Compliance with contracts is value-enhancing for agents.
Condition 1 has been made implicitly in the discussion of the previous sections.
Clearly, for reputation to be valued, the enforcement of contracts must in some way
contribute to the maximization of agents' objective function.
Condition 2: Agents are sequentially rational, ie., memory and learning exist.
A sequentially rational agent has two notable attributes: a multi-period objective
function and a strategy that can be modified in light of new information. Therefore, in
a contractual environment characterized by sequential reality, an agent's strategy is
flexible and dependent upon previous experiences. For reputation to work, this type of
rationality is clearly essential because if agents had no memory, or if they did not modify
behavior on the basis of this memory, reputation would be meaningless.
Condition 3: Agents operate in a supergame environment.
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A supergame is a series of contractual situations, i.e., sub-games like Figure 3, linked
by the participation of a common agent. In the case of reputation building, the common
agent who endures throughout the supergame must be the reputation builder. For
example, repetitions of the game depicted in Figure 3, in which player B endures, would
be a suitable supergame. There may be many player A's as long as each can observe the
previous players' experiences, and thus learn from them.
The agent building the reputation (player B in Figure 3) must also believe that the
supergame is either of infinite duration, or that there is some uncertainty over whether
or not the supergame is infinite, or that there is some uncertainty over the agent's
rationality. If a supergame is of known finite duration, then a simple argument reveals
that the game collapses into a single-play environment: on the last iteration of the
supergame, both players know that the agent will abuse trust, thus the principal will not
offer trust; consequently, the agent will rationally renege on the penultimate iteration.
Knowing this, the principal will not offer the contract on the penultimate repetition,
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etc. The game unravels with no reputation effect.
Condition 4: The behavioral trait upon which contractual enforcement rests (and for
which the reputation is built) is observable ex-post by the principal, but not costIessly
venfiable.

environments characterized by ,
the informational asymmetry tal
payoff matrix. In this situation 0
to build a reputation because th€
she was "honoring trust."

Condition 4's rationale becomes apparent if extreme scenarios are considered. A firm
endeavoring to build a reputation for timely debt repayment behavior would be unwise
to issue twenty-year, zero-coupon-rate bonds. If it were to do so, the firm would clearly
not start building its reputation for twenty years, since its ability to repay the debt would
not be tested until then. Contrarily, if the firm were to issue coupon-paying debt (or
short-term, zero-coupon debt) its reputation could be built considerably faster. Similar
logic has been applied in the context of reputation's ability to distinguish superior
mutual-fund performance: "since the amount of time it takes to discern quality of
portfolio performance is lengthy in financial markets, reputation is unlikely to have
much substantial basis. Inferior performers should survive for a long time, as is consistent
with empirical evidence" (Dybvig and Spatt, 1985, p. 4).
At the other extreme, if contracts are costlessly verifiable, then explicit enforcement
would be costless and reputation's role as an enforcer of implicit contracts would be
trivial. Thus reputation clearly requires the existence of at least some simple moral
hazard-type market imperfection as is the case, for example, in Figure 3.

The Decision to Build a Reputat

Reputation and Adverse Selection

2) A firm builds a reputatiOI
stakeholders (e.g., customers, cn

Conditions 3 and 4 above imply that, when valuing an implicit claim, the principal
should consider the strategy of the claim seller, i.e., the agent. Ifit appears probable that
the agent believes the supergame is near termination (e.g., the agent is soon to retire or
shift geographical location), then the principal should exercise caution when purchasing
implicit claims valued on the basis of the agent's reputation.
Similarly, if the principal believes that the fundamental tenets of a supergame
environment do not apply unambiguously to the claim in question, then caution must
again be exercised in valuing that claim. For example, a reputable small-town auto
mechanic may have little incentive to maintain her reputation while working on an out
of-state car that she believes is just passing through town (at least this is true within the
finance paradigm, we ignore for now the idea that this mechanic may feel some moral
compunction to service the car well). In this situation, Condition 3 is clearly breached:
the principal (transient car owner) will be unable to pass on his opinion of the repair
work to future principals (i.e., future auto-repair customers).
Condition 4 requires that the behavioral trait for which the agent builds a reputation
be observable after the fact. Thus, in an environment characterized by informational
asymmetry, the principal should be wary of reading too much into the agent's
reputational signal. Reputation, therefore, may have little power to enforce contracts in
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environments characterized by adverse selection. Imagine a modified Figure 3 in which
the informational asymmetry takes the form of the principal being unable to observe the
payoff matrix. In this situation of adverse selection, the agent (player B) would be unable
to build a reputation because the principal would be unable to determine whether or not
she was "honoring trust."

~ scenarios

The Decision to Build a Reputation
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In balance sheet terms, a firm's reputation at any time can be viewed as both an asset
and a liability. On the asset side is the increased value of the implicit claims sold by the
firm now and in the future. While on the liability side is the present value of honoring
these claims in the future. For example, consider a durable-good producer that has built
a reputation for superior post-sales service. The present value of the price premiums that
the firm receives on sales of its product as a result of the reputation would be an asset.
While the liability would be the present value ofthe cost ofproviding superior after-sales
service in the future. Thus our discussion so far has identified four key characteristics of
a corporate reputation:
I) A firm can have several reputations for different attributes, not to mention the
reputations of individuals within the firm that may be distinct from the overall firm
reputation.
2) A firm builds a reputation by demonstrating a consistent mode of behavior to its
stakeholders (e.g., customers, creditors, shareholders, etc.).
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3) The building or maintaining of a reputation can require net expenditures in the
short-run, presumably in the expectation of net revenues in the long-run. Thus the
decision whether to build or maintain a reputation at any time can essentially be viewed
as a capital budgeting decision.
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4) A firm's reputation can act as an implicit contractual enforcement mechanism:
An agent's long-term desire to maintain its reputation may induce it to act in the interest
of the principal in the short-term.
These four characteristics, in turn, prompt the following definition of a corporate
reputation:

A reputation is a behavioral trait. A firm builds a reputation by demonstrating a
consistent mode ofbehavior through a series ofcontractual situations. Once buik a
reputation increases the value ofimplicit claimssold bythe firm to stakeholders. Thus
a firm's desire to earn future profits by maintaining its reputation may act as an
implicit contractual enforcement mechanism.
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For example, a firm with a reputation for creditworthiness will be able to sell its
subordinated debt at a premium compared to less reputable firms. This premium
represents the value of an implicit claim. By paying the premium creditors buy an
implicit claim that the reputable firm will make timely interest and principal payments
(assuming that, in the event of default, these creditors would be unable to recoup their
losses from the residual assets of the firm, thus making their claim explicit). Mortgage
bond holders, on the other hand, need not be as concerned with the firm's reputation for
creditworthiness because their claim is explicit: in any outcome they recoup their
investment.
The Power of Reputation
But, from a practical perspective, how powerful a force is reputation in
contemporary business environments? Can a manager's desire to build or maintain a
reputation be relied upon consistently to enforce business contracts? If it can, then there
seems little need to consider other non-material, opportunism-based notions of
rationality: the ill effects of opportunism will be successfully reined in by agents' desire
to build and maintain their reputations. There will be little or no need for ethics, or more
precisely an intrinsic commitment to honor trust, as a constraint on behavior.
Sadly, one does not have to look far to find ample evidence that reputation is not
enough: as a solution to agency problems, the "reputation solution" is no solution. Enron,
World-Com, and Tyco represent just the tip of the agency-problem ice berg. One only
needs to read the financial press or flip through a business-ethics casebook to find many
similar scenarios. In all of these cases, implicit contracts were not adequately enforced
by the desire of agents to preserve either their own reputations or the reputation of their
firm. The economic mechanism of reputation is not enough. Financial-economic
rationality does not naturally result in optimal equilibria, what economists call "first
best" outcomes. Regardless of what happens in reality, even in finance theory there is
room for ethics.
Thus ethical behavior among participants in a financial contracting situation can be
viewed as a type of implicit contractual enforcement mechanism. Note that ethical
behavior - such as 'honoring trust' in Figure 3 - is not irrational or suboptimal since it
leads to a stable cooperative equilibrium between principal and agent. Of course this
ethical equilibrium relies on the principal 'trusting' the agent to cooperate. And indeed
this is the ethics challenge in business: to instill honest and trustworthy behavior among
market participants. If this challenge is met, then it's a win-win situation; both principal
and agent flourish in a self-perpetuating cooperative relation.
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provide students with some practical guidance on how to make the best decision in any
given situation. This can be achieved in two stages.
First, students must have some background in basic ethics theory. They may already
have this background from a class in business ethics or moral philosophy, but to ensure
they have the necessary intellectual tools to make sound moral judgments the instructor
could assign some basic readings on ethics theory. Chapters Four, Five, and Six of Finance
Ethics: The Rationality of Virtue provides a summary of basic ethics theory as it relates
to finance.
Second, assign finance case studies that will enable the students to apply the ethics
theory to specific decision situations in finance. Many case sources are available (see, for
example, http://www.ibe.org.ukl). The instructor may choose to make up his or her own
case vignettes (see Appendix One for an example). Or some already assigned finance cases
that involve behavioral choices could be discussed from the perspective of ethics. For
example, Robert F. Bruner's Case Studiesin Finance (2002) text provides many ostensibly
finance cases that can also be viewed from an ethics perspective. In this context, see also
Hess and Strands, "Teaching Ethics in Investment Classes: A Series of case Vignettes"
(2004).
LEVEL THREE INTEGRATION
My finance department offers a class entitled "Ethics and Behavioral Finance". The
class is devoted entirely to an analysis ofthe behavioral foundations of finance from both
a normative and positive perspective. The offering of this type of class represents level
three integration.
This level of commitment to financial ethics obviously involves a significant
departmental resource allocation. Appendix Two is the syllabus for the class mentioned
above. Other instructors may choose different approaches. But whatever the approach
chosen, the class should benefit from the ever-broader literature on behavioral finance,
business ethics, and indeed financial ethics, as reflected in the assigned readings of the
syllabus in Appendix Two.
CONCLUSION

nake their students aware of the
nance. The next logical step is to

This article begins from the premise that there should be some integration of ethics
into the finance curriculum. Three possible levels of integration are presented, each
requiring a progressively greater commitment of departmental resources.
Level One Integration merely makes students aware of the normative content of the
behavioral assumptions that underlie finance pedagogy. Level Two Integration builds on
level one by ensuring students have a grounding in ethics theory, and by applying that
theory to specific decision situations in finance. Level Three Integration requires the
greatest commitment of departmental resources. It involves establishing a course
specifically on financial ethics.
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APPENDIX ONE

Now please answer the fol1owin~

WORK SHOP ON FINANCIAL ETHICS

1) Which type of funds will )
or Income Funds? Why; please b

WELCOME: Please readth e followi ng case vignette carefully; then answer
the questions
below briefly in the space provid ed
You recentl y landed your dream job. You are workin g as a junior financi
al planne r
for Smith and Jones Wealth Manag ement Inc., the largest financial plannin
g firm in SLO
county.
You current ly have several clients, mostly elderly retired, and your job
is to advise
them on the best investm ent vehicles in which they should invest their
savings.
Mostly you recomm end mutual funds, which are diversified pools ofstock
s. Mutual
funds are current ly the most popula r type of investm ent vehicle in the
United States.
Curren tly you deal with two basic types of mutual fund. Growth Funds,
which can
be risky in the sense that returns generally vary over time, but they
offer the chance of
high returns in some years; or Income Funds, which are less volatile
but offer returns
that just match market averages.
Given that your clients are elderly and thus rely on investm ent returns
for a steady
income, the rule-of -thumb implies that they should be in less risky investm
ents, namely
Income Funds. Also, given that Income Funds are more passively manage
d they tend to
charge lower fees, thus they are slightly cheape r for the client.
So, all else being equal, this sounds like a no brainer. Put your clients
in the Income
Funds. But all else is not equal. Unlike the Income Funds, the Growth
Funds offer what
is generally called 'directe d brokerage'.
Directed brokerage is a sales commission that the Growth Funds will
pay you for
putting your client in their fund. This also partly explains why the fee
charged to your
client is higher for the Growth Funds: your client is basically paying
an extra fee to you
when they pay the higher commission fee to the Growth Fund. Ofcour
se the client does
not know this, unless you choose to tell them.
So, in making your choice of which fund to recomm end to your clients
you are faced
with a dilemma; what economists call a 'conflict of interest'. Unless
you and the client
just happen to get lucky and the Growth Funds do well, rule-of -thumb
would indicate
that the client is better served by you putting them in the Income
Funds: the Income
Funds charge the client lower fees and offer a more stable return over
time.
But you persona lly will make more money by recomm ending the Growth
Funds. A
large part of your income comes from commissions, and you can virtuall
y double your
commission income in anyone year by consistently recomm ending Growth
Funds over
Income Funds. SLO county is an expensive area and you're struggli
ng to buy a house.
You'd also really like to buy a more prestigious car to go with your 'profess
ional' status.
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Now please answer the following questions:

,LETRICS

1) Which type of funds will you recommend to your elderly clients, Growth Funds
or Income Funds? Why; please be as specific as possible.

lrefully; then answerthe questions

2) Regardless of your answer to Question 1, what exactly do you think would be
'wrong' with recommending the other type of fund? Is your answer based on moral
reasoning or on economic reasoning?

rking as a junior financial planner
test financial planning firm in SLO
y retired, and your job is to advise
lhould invest their savings.
diversified pools of stocks. Mutual
ent vehicle in the United States.
11 fund. Growth Funds, which can
time, but they offer the chance of
are less volatile but offer returns

m investment returns for a steady
~ in less risky investments, namely
re passively managed they tend to
he client.
er. Put your clients in the Income
Ids, the Growth Funds offer what
e Growth Funds will pay you for
.ains why the fee charged to your
isically paying an extra fee to you
th Fund. OfCourse the client does

3) As you may know, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently
investigated broker behavior, and found that -- in the language of our scenario -- many
brokers were actually recommending the Growth Funds to elderly clients. Imagine you
are one ofthese brokers, and that you are being interviewed by an SEC investigator. How
might you try to justify your choice of the Growth Fund?
4) Returning to your answer to Question 1. What, if any, general principles from
your education or personal life did you use as guidance in making your choice?

Thank-you for participating in our (sadly all too brief) discussion today. Now please
answer these last few questions. You mayleave when you're finished. Please don't forget
to turn this in on your way out; and Thanks again for Coming!
5) Has our discussion today altered or modified in any way your original choice of
Income versus Growth Fund, and the reasons for your choice.
6) In light of our discussion, how would you define your 'professional' obligation as
a financial planner? To whom do you owe your primary obligation, and why?
7) Why do you think it is that the SEC identified so many brokers choosing the
'Growth Fund' in the 'real world'? What will you do in the real world?

nend to your clients you are faced
rerest'. Unless you and the client
~ll, rule-of-thumb would indicate
n the Income Funds: the Income
able return over time.
)mmending the Growth Funds. A
nd you can virtually double your
commending Growth Funds over
you're struggling to buy a house.
~o with your 'professional' status.
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APPENDIX TWO
ETHICS AND BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, SYLLABUS
COURSE OBJECTIVE: This course will cover contemporary theoretical and empirical
issues in behavioral finance and financial ethics. Topics may include: agency and
signaling theory, reputation models, game theory applications, ethics theory and
applications in finance. These topics will be applied to realistic situations in financial
services, investment banking, securities analysis, etc. This course will also address the
content and justification of the Codes of Ethics supplied by the governing bodies of the
CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER, and CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
designations.
REQUIRED TEXTS:
1) Ethics in Finance, John R. Boatright, (Blackwell, 1999)
2) Finance Ethics, John Dobson, (Univ. Press, 1997)
3) Ethics and Behavioral Finance, (Readings Packet)
COURSE SCHEDULE
Module I: THE NOTION OF RATIONALITY IN FINANCE:
Week One 9/20 and 9/22: "Within The Finance Paradigm"
w i.Dobson, Introduction and Ch.1: "The Finance Paradox"
w2.Dobson, Ch.2: "A Contractual Problem"
Week Two 9/27 and 9/29:
m3.Boatright, pp. 46-52: "Agency Theory"
m4.Dobson, Ch. 3: "Is Reputation Enough?"
w5.Boatright, pp. 169-182: "The Financial Theory of the firm"
MODULE II: EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST THE 'RATIONAL' AGENT.
Week Three 10/4 and 10/6:
Readings Packet: (All readings from Financial Analysts Journal)
m6.Thaler, "The End of Behavioral Finance?"
m7.Statman, "Behavioral Finance: Past battles ..."
m8.Daniel and Titman, "Market Efficiency in an Irrational World"
w9.Nowak and Sigmund, "Cooperation versus Competition"
w10.Chan et al., "New Paradigm or Same Old Hype .."
Week Four 10/11 and 10/13: (All readings from Financial Analysts Journal)
ml.Raghibur and Das, "A Case for Theory-Driven Experimental Enquiry"
m2.scott et aI., "Behavioral Bias, Valuation, and Active Management"
w3.Statman, "Socially Responsible Mutual Funds"
w4.Hirschey, "How 'Foolish' Are Internet Investors?"
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MODULE III: ALTERNATIVE NC
Week Five 10/18 and 10/20: Mode
m5.Boatright, Ch. 1, "Financial Eth
m6.Boatright, pp. 53-61 "Philosopl
w7.Boatright, pp. 182-198, "Ethical
Week Six 10/25 and 10/27: Classic:
m8.Dobson, Ch. 7, "Which Ratione
m9.Dobson, Ch. 8, "Practical Ratio
w10.Dobson, Ch. 10, "Toward a NE
MODULE IV: PRACTICAL IMPL
Week Seven 11/1 and 1113:
m1, m2, m3.CERTIFIED FINAN(
ANALYST(Grp. 2), and CHARTEF
content and justification.
w4.Boatright, Ch. 3, "Ethical Issue:
w5.Boatright, Ch. 4, "Ethical Issue:
w6.Boatright, Ch. 5, "Ethical Issue:
Week Eight 11/8 and 11/10:
m7.Dobson, Ch. 4, "Toward ReCOIl
m8.Dobson, Ch. 5, "Ethics in Final
w9.Dobson, Ch. 6, "Some Intemat
wlO.Dobson, Ch. 9, "Some Gendel
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MODULE III: ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF RATIONALITY

,NCE, SYLLABUS
Week Five 10/18 and 10/20: Modem Ethics Theory
m5.Boatright, Ch. 1, "Financial Ethics: An Overview"
m6.Boatright, pp. 53-61 "Philosophical Ethics"
w7.Boatright, pp. 182-198, "Ethical Implications"
Week Six 10/25 and 10/27: Classical (Post-modem) Ethics theory
m8.Dobson, Ch. 7, "Which Rationality?"
m9.Dobson, Ch. 8, "Practical Rationality"
wlO.Dobson, Ch. 10, "Toward a New Finance Paradigm".

!mporary theoretical and empirical
Topics may include: agency and
V" applications, ethics theory and
1 to realistic situations in financial
:. This course will also address the
lied by the governing bodies of the
~TERED FINANCIAL ANALYST

MODULE IV: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHICS IN FINANCE
Week Seven 11/1 and 11/3:
m1, m2, m3.CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER(Grp. 1), CHARTERED FINANCIAL
ANALYST(Grp. 2), and CHARTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT(Grp. 3); Codes of ethics,
content and justification.
w4.Boatright, Ch. 3, "Ethical Issues in Financial Services"
w5.Boatright, Ch. 4, "Ethical Issues in Investment Decisions"
w6.Boatright, Ch. 5, "Ethical Issues in Financial Markets"
Week Eight 11/8 and 11/10:
m7.Dobson, Ch. 4, "Toward Reconciling Ethics and Finance"
m8.Dobson, Ch. 5, "Ethics in Financial Practice"
w9.Dobson, Ch. 6, "Some International Implications"
wlO.Dobson, Ch. 9, "Some Gender Implications"
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